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Abstract 
Considerable political contention has 
developed over the dams and large-scale 
irrigation schemes in northern Nigeria. 
The reasons are the resettlement of peo- 
ple that they require as well as their en- 
vironmen tal effects, their economic 
inefficiency and other social conse- 
quences. This article discusses these is- 
sues with reference specijically to the 
Kafin Zaki Dam proposal, challeniging 
the conventional image of an alignment 
of international organizations and d e  
mestic elites on one side and grassroots 
forces on the other. The conclusion is 
that the political contest is carried out 
essentially at the elite level and that 
state and international agencies at 
times do oppose mega-projects that dis- 
place peopleand disrupt ecological proc- 
esses. 
Des d t d l t s  politiques considkrables se 
sont dheloppts autour de la question 
des barrages et de I'irrigation h grande 
tchelle au Nord-Nigeria. Les raisons en 
sont: les relocalisations de populations 
que ces projets entrainent, leur impact 
sur l'environnement, leur ineficacitt 
tconornique, ainsi qu'une kyrielle 
d'autres constquences sociales. Le prC- 
sent article aborde ces questions en se 
rifkrant sptcifiquemen t au cas du projet 
de barrage d u  Kafin Zaki, et remet en 
question la conception conventionnelle 
d'unface h face sur cette question entre 
les organisations internationales et les 
elites locales d'un c6tt et les forces du 
terroir de l'autre. La conclusion est plp- 
t6t que le conflit politique se livre prin- 
cipalement au niveau klitaire, et que les 
agences nationales et internationales en 
mennent avec le temps h s'opposer h ce 
type de mgaprojet qui delace massive- 
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ment les populations et perturbe pro- 
f o n d h m t  le processus tcologique. 
Introduction 
Large scale irrigation schemes and 
dams dot the landscape of northern 
Nigeria. There are criticisms of these 
projects, funded in the 1970s. Problems 
identified include economic ineffi- 
ciency, class-bias, health hazards and 
environmental effects (Watts 1987). 
However, the issue of resistance to irri- 
gation and dam projects and especially 
the role of factions of international 
agencies and some parts of the state 
has not been explored in this regard. 
Indeed, most of the literature on irriga- 
tion schemes in northern Nigeria has 
only focused on the negative roles of 
international and national agencies 
(ibid., 1987). 
There are many examples of inter- 
national agencies, multilateral and bi- 
lateral, playing negative roles of 
environmental destruction. However, 
in the case of the Kafin Zaki Dam 
project in the Yobe Basin, these agen- 
cies worked together to successfully to 
stop construction, in conjunction with 
some parts of the Nigerian state and 
Nigerian organisations. This case 
study questions the assumption of 
monolithic states, governments and 
international agencies prevalent in 
much of the development studies lit- 
erature. 
The Geography and Ecology of the 
Yobe Basin 
The Kumadugu River's Yobe Basin is 
located in the northeast of northern 
Nigeria and covers about 9 percent of 
the country's land. Kumadugu Yobe 
has a catchment area of about 85,000 
square kilometres. Its three main tribu- 
taries are the River Hadejia, the River 
Jama'are and the Kumadugu Gana. 
The Hadejia has the largest catchment 
area of 30,000 square kilometres at the 
western end of the basin, the Jama'are 
has 20,000 square kilometres and joins 
the Hadejia near Gashua to form the 
Hadejia-Jama'are. The River Hadejia- 
Jama'are meets the Kumadugu Gana 
near Geidam to form the Kumadugu 
Yobe (NEAZDP 1990,9). 
Nearly all of northern Nigeria is an 
ecologically sensitive zone. Desert ex- 
pansion is the most serious environ- 
mental hazard. In recent years as much 
as 38 percent of the land is lost to deser- 
tification, and about 30 million people 
have been affected. The rate of deserti- 
fication can be as high as 35 kilometres 
per year. In the 1972-73 drought alone, 
cattle mortality was at 20 percent. 
These ecological shifts are due to cli- 
matic changes, population increase 
and livestock pressure. According to 
the World Bank (1990,17), human ac- 
tivities rather than climatic changes are 
the most sigruficant causes of environ- 
mental variation. They include bush 
burning, human population move- 
ment, overgrazing and the increased 
use of mechanical methods of land 
clearing. Apart from these factors, 
major causes of environmental stress 
are engineering and agronomic biases 
of water resource development and 
management (Gadzama 1991,9). 
Ecological realities coupled with re- 
gional politics, "developmentalism," 
nationalism and the oil boom have 
been invoked to make a case for dam 
reservoirs in northern Nigeria. The 
construction of water reservoirs are 
meant for urban water supply and 
large scale irrigation projects. In the 
Yobe Basin, there are twenty-two 
dams existing, under construction and 
proposed with a catchment area of 
31,303 square kilometres (NEAZDP 
1990,16). Traditionally, surface water, 
wells and small dams have been used 
for urban water supply. Similarly, 
flooding, shadoof (a suspended pole 
with a bucket at one end and a weight 
at the other), wells, calabash, and other 
hand-held-bailer irrigation methods 
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have been used in agriculture. Later, 
diesel-driven pumps and tube wells 
were introduced for the purpose of 
small-scale irrigation. 
There are three major dams in the 
upstream region of the Yobe Basin. 
These include Tiga, Challawa and 
Bagauda. All these dams are around 
Kano. They provide water to the city of 
Kano and the Kano Irrigation Project 
Phase 1. The biggest of the dams is Tiga 
which was constructed 1971-74 
(NEAZDP 1990,16). River regulation 
has potential beneficial effects of re- 
ducing harmful flooding of agricul- 
tural land downstream, but could have 
the negative effects of undermining 
flooding of the large fadama (flood 
plain) on which millions of people de- 
pend for traditional agriculture and 
irrigation, livestock grazing, and the 
recharging of the aquifers. Social con- 
flicts due to loss of livelihood and the 
threat of displacement are some of the 
consequences. 
The Kafin Zaki Dam Proposal 
The damming of the river systems in 
northern Nigeria has instigated de- 
bates on the merits and demerits of 
such projects. A case in point is the 
Kafin Zaki Dam. On the one hand, a 
disparate interest group has been dog- 
gedly championing the cause of the 
project. On the other hand, aloose stra- 
tegic alliance of various institutions, 
individuals and organisations, foreign 
and domestic, successfully lobbied 
against the construction of the Kafin 
Zaki Dam. I shall name and discuss the 
groups in the debate on the merits and 
demerits of damming in the Yobe Ba- 
sin, and the strategies and arguments 
invoked. 
The Kafin Zaki Dam has an intellec- 
tual origin in the Schultz report funded 
by the Canadian International Devel- 
opment Agency and an earlier study 
funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development 
(HNWCP and NIPSS 1993, 19; 
NEAZDP 1990). The 1972-74 drought 
in the Sahel was the proximate impe- 
tus for the project. But it was only dur- 
ing the Shagari regime (1979433) that a 
contract was awarded for the project to 
Julius Berger, a German construction 
company. In 1984, the Buhari regime 
(1984-85) terminated the contract as 
part of its budgetary control measure, 
but that decision was reversed in De- 
cember 1992 by the Babangida regime 
(1985-93). The latter requested Julius 
Berger to continue the project at a cost 
of N10 billion.' It was expected that on 
completion of the project an area of 
&4,000 hectares would be irrigated. In 
1994, the Abacha regime (1993- 
present) terminated the contract and 
later appointed a judicial commission 
of inquiry under Jus tice Sanusi Ciroma 
Yusuf. The Commission was man- 
dated to look into the origin and scope 
of the project, the manner and worth of 
its contract, as well as the role of staff in 
the Ministry of Water Resources and 
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Rural Development (New Nigerian 
April 8,1993). 
Support for the Kafin Zaki Darn 
The argument in support of the dam is 
led by a powerful interest group. The 
Schultz report intellectually rational- 
ises the need for the project while 
JuIius Berger, the most important con- 
struction company in Nigeria, lobbies 
in its support. Most of the important 
constructions in Abuja, the new fed- 
eral capital, are executed by the cam- 
pany. Indeed, the new capital is often 
referred to as Berger city. Similarly, the 
company has on its board some of the 
most powerful individuals in the coun- 
try. 
Another important source of sup- 
port for the project is political/bureau- 
cratic. In December 1992 when the 
government authorised the company 
to proceed, the Minister responsible 
for water resources was Abubakar 
Hashidu. Hashidu was the former 
General Manager of the Hadejia- 
Jamalare River Basin Development 
Authority. In fact, the contract was 
awarded within the last week of his 
tenure as Minister. In addition, both 
Hashidu and the then Governor of the 
CentraI Bank, Abdulkadir Ahmed, 
come from the area where the projects 
are located. 
Geopolitically, the dam is situated 
in an area which has always provided 
political support to the mainstream of 
northern Nigeria politics. They also 
belong to the Hausa-Fulani ethnic 
group. In contrast, the downstream 
users in Yobe and Borno states are la- 
belled as minority ethnic groups. Po- 
litically, this group generally supports 
parties that oppose the mainstream of 
northern Nigerian politics. 
The support for the project is in- 
voked by bureaucrats using national- 
ist rhetoric. Irrigation is justified as a 
strategy for national food security. The 
alternative to irrigation is character- 
ised as undermining national self-reli- 
ance. For example, in reaction to 
criticisms of the project Aminu (1991, 
1805) accuses the critics of Kafin Zaki 
Dam of needlessly involving environ- 
mental issues and losing sight of the 
benefits of the project. The problem, 
according to the government, is 
drought and not irrigation schemes. 
This conclusion was reached despite 
the fact that the Ministry has not car- 
ried out environmental impact sur- 
veys. Dubious figures are officially 
used to minimise the impact of the 
projects on the downstream users, e.g. 
that the Kafin Zaki Dam is only 10.6 
percent of the catchment area of the 
Yobe Basin. Furthermore, faith is 
placed in technology: better utilisation 
through controlled releases. In a con- 
cluding commentary by Aminu (1991, 
1805), even environmentalism is again 
appropriated: "we will also ensure that 
the environment is fully protected, in- 
cluding the Ngwu [sic] Wetland which 
provides sanctuary to the migratory 
birds from Europe during the winter 
months." Aminu is deliberately men- 
tioning Europe because the article he 
was referring to was written by a Euro- 
pean. 
Opposition to the Kaf'in Zaki Dam 
Much of the prominent opposition to 
the project comes from the Nigerian 
Conservation Foundation (NCF), 
Borno and Yobe state governments, 
the North East Arid Zone Develop- 
ment Program (NEAZDP), the 
Hadejia-Nguru Wetland Conserva- 
tion Project (HNWCP), and the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(FEPA). International agencies such as 
those of the European Union and the 
World Bank are also opposed to the 
project. The alliance does not involve 
grassroots organisations but works 
primarily through the structures of the 
state to influence policy makers. The 
NCF consists of some of the top elite of 
Nigerian society. For example, the 
former chair of the National Transi- 
tional Government, Ernest Shonekan 
(August-November 1993), was a 
former chair of the NCF. A. P. Leventis, 
of the Leventis conglomerate, is chair 
of the Scientific Committee of the NCF. 
The NEAZDP is partially funded by 
the European Union and is implement- 
ing several other projects in the coun- 
try. The HNWCP is a collaborative 
project of the Royal Society for the Pro- 
tection of Birds, the Nigerian Conser- 
vation Union, the Finnish Association 
for Nature Conservation and the 
World Conservation Union. The 
World Bank is also funding a small 
fadama (flood plain) irrigation project 
which covers some of the area in the 
Yobe Basin that could be negatively 
affected by the Kafin Zaki Dam. The 
Dam restricts the water that would 
have been used for small-scale irriga- 
tion projects. The FEPA is the environ- 
mental watchdog of the government. 
At the time of strong opposition to 
Kafin Zaki, the chairperson of the 
board of the FEPA was Bukar Shaib 
who is an indigene of the area most 
likely to be negatively affected by the 
dam construction. 
Opposition to the project is based on 
technical, economic and environmen- 
tal arguments. In a meeting initiated 
by the NCF with Ernest Shonekan, the 
NCF argued that, while controlled re- 
lease could have a beneficial effect to 
downstream users, the technical effi- 
ciency and management of the Kafin 
Zaki Dam is suspect in light of previ- 
ous experiences with similar projects. 
There is no guarantee that there is the 
technical and managerial capacity to 
release an adequate, timely water sup- 
ply to downstream users. For example, 
when the Tiga Dam was completed, 
the Federal Government guaranteed 
1,350 million cubic metres of water to 
pass through Gashua annually but this 
has not been implemented (HNWCP 
and NIPSS 1993,3). In fact, even farm- 
ers in the upstream of the Kano River 
Project suffer great losses. Similarly, 
the Challawa Gorge Dam was closed 
in 1992 without any warning to the 
downstream users, leading to massive 
losses. 
The economic problems relating to 
the dam have been identified as high 
capital cost, low yields, underestima- 
tion of the volume and values of exist- 
ing production, high management 
costs, and especially poor returns for 
small irrigating farmers. The Kafin 
Zaki project is at best a "cathedral in 
the desert," just like its counterparts in 
many other parts of the country. The 
returns of the project promise to be 
I 
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minimal based on previous experi- 
ences. For instance, the three major 
irrigation schemes in northern Ni- 
geria, Bakolori, Kano River Project and 
South Tchad, were expected to irrigate 
320,000 hectares and 2 million hectares 
in 1982. But by 1982, the actual irri- 
gated land was 30,706 hectares. By 
this same year, on the other hand, 
800,000 hectares were irrigated by sea- 
sonal flooding. A study by Barbier 
(NEAZDP 19954) shows that net ben- 
efits in wetland small-scale irrigation 
are N239 per hectare compared to only 
N19 per hectare in the irrigated area of 
the Kano River Project. If the net ben- 
efits are assessed in terms of water pro- 
ductivity, then the net benefits per 
1,000 cubic metre of water used in the 
wetland is N31.80 while in the Kano 
River Project it is N1.lO. Indeed, stud- 
ies by Kirnmage and Adams (1992) 
have shown the superiority of indig- 
enous use of wetlands in terms of not 
only the economics of production but 
ecological sustainability. (The com- 
parison is made because of the negative 
impact Kafin Zaki would have had on 
small-scale irrigation in the wetlands). 
NEAZDP, which more than any 
other organisation worked quietly to 
protect the Yobe Basin, estimates that 
current loss in production due to the 
dam from rice, small-scale irrigation, 
livestock production and fisheries at 
N730 million to N1.35 billion per year. 
The potential loss to production due to 
the dam from small-scale irrigation, 
livestock production, and fisheries is 
between N1.65 billion to 3 billion per 
year in 1990 in the Yobe state alone. 
Yobe and Bomo States, two major 
states that provide livestock in the 
country, will be adversely affected. It 
is estimated that 1.5 million cattle and 
other livestock are in danger. 
There are international dimensions 
of the economic losses as well. Hun- 
dreds of Niger Republic small-scale- 
irrigation cultivators and pastoralists 
depend on the flow of the river 
(NEAZDP 1992). Similarly, the imple- 
mentation of the project would worsen 
the budgetary situation and damage 
the relationship between Nigeria and 
its creditors who would not see any 
basis for debt relief (Ogbonnaya l993a, 
81-2; Ogbonnaya 1993b, B4). 
The ecological and human impact of 
the Kafin Zaki Dam project would 
have been very serious. In many cases, 
dams have resulted in extensive dis- 
placement, costly resettlement and 
discontent among those who are reset- 
tled. Other negative impacts include 
the collapse of traditional farming 
practices, its replacement by more vul- 
nerable monocultural agriculture, 
threat to fishing, destruction of the 
wildlife sanctuaries in the wetlands 
and especially the Nguru and Dagona 
bird sanctuaries, and threats to 
transhumance (Synge 1991,1536). 
There are various experiences of 
water loss due to large dams in north- 
em Nigeria. For example, when the 
Tiga Dam was completed in 1976, the 
river flow at Gashua was reduced by 
about 100 million cubic metres per year 
by irrigation and by more than 50 mil- 
lion cubic metres by evaporation. If the 
Kafin Zaki Dam is constructed it 
would result in the reduction in flow at 
Gashua by 1,275 million cubic metres 
per year. Moreover, Kafin Zaki would 
stretch 17 kilometres and create a res- 
ervoir of 235 square kilometres which 
would evaporate up to 450 million cu- 
bic metres of water per year. The losses 
due to evaporation to downstream us- 
ers would be US$1 million per annum 
(Martin 1993, 2; NEAZDP 1993, 2-3; 
Thompson 1993, 12). This is a major 
loss of water. 
The construction of the Kafin Zaki 
Dam would have negatively affected 
ground water recharge in the basin. 
The recharging of the Tchad aquifer 
depends on the flood of the River 
Jama'are. The consequences of a dis- 
ruption would be the shortage of water 
for human consumption, livestockand 
small-scale irrigation. The livelihood 
of about three million people would be 
jeopardised in Borno and Yobe states 
alone. 
There are several other implications 
of the effects of the Kafin Zaki Dam. 
Identity conflicts would be intensified 
in the region, especially between 
pastoralists and small-scale-irrigation 
farmers. The pastoralists may be 
fodced to migrate southward towards 
the Middle Belt which would only in- 
temrfy the existing conflict in the re- 
gion. Rural-urban migration would 
increase. This would only compound 
the current situation and probably lead 
to further social conflicts. On the other 
hand, pressure on tudu farming (up- 
land), which is already overstretched, 
would increase. The lack of flow of the 
river system would only accelerate the 
process of sand dune formations and 
these would increase the process of 
desertification. 
While the opposition to the project 
has a formidable argument, the alter- 
native has not been clearly defined. 
There is, however, a wide feeling that 
there must be a mechanism to harness 
the water resources of the Yobe Basin 
by a single agency. At present the Yobe 
Basin is under the jurisdictions of the 
Chad Basin River Development Au- 
thority and the Hadejia-Jama'are River 
Basin Development Authority. This 
has led to several difficulties. For ex- 
ample, when the latter decided to close 
the Challawa Gorge Dam, this was not 
communicated to the former. Sec- 
ondly, there is a need for a national 
policy on water resources. Thirdly, the 
opposition expects independent 
environmental reviews of projects 
(NEAZDP 1993). 
Conclusion 
This article shows that, while in many 
instances state and international agen- 
cies play a destructive role by funding 
mega-projects, this is not always the 
case. The politics of the Kafin Zaki 
Dam proposal shows that factions 
within these structures at times play a 
progressive oppositional role as the 
socially and environmentally disrup- 
tive effects become apparent. 
Notes 
1. The value of the Nara to US dollar was: 
N10 to US$1 in 1990, N21 to U S 1  in 1992, 
and N85 to U S 1  in 1996. 
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